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INTRODUCTION 
Marveon, Inc. petitions the court to rehear only the last 
two paragraphs of the Court's Opinion filed February 10, 1989, 
i.e., only that portion of the Opinion which would remand to 
the trial court for further proceedings on damages. 
As is explained more fully below, Marveon petitions the 
court to rehear this portion of the Opinion, and only this 
portion of the Opinion, on the grounds and for the reasons 
that: 1) this portion of the court's opinion is clearly beyond 
the record on appeal; 2) the issue was not raised nor litigated 
below and therefore was not briefed on appeal; 3) this Court 
misconstrues the very case upon which it relies for the remand; 
4) there is no reason why a party in breach of contract should 
get the fortuitous windfall of insurance the non-breaching 
party to the contract may have obtained; and 5) it makes no 
sense for a party in breach of contract in one case to pay in 
full, a second breaching party in a second case to pay one-
half, and yet a third breaching party in a third case to pay 
nothing at all, all depending on whether the non-breaching 
party in the three cases either provided no insurance, obtained 
insurance that would contribute 50-50, or obtained purely 
primary insurance coverage. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON 
DAMAGES. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently and repeatedly held 
that appeals must be based on the record developed below. 
Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Hutchinqs, 672 P.2d 404 (Utah 1983); State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 
92 (Utah 1983); Cooper v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1983); 
In re Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978); Ream v. Fitzer, 581 P.2d 
145 (Utah 1978); Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc., 567 
P.2d 174 (Utah 1977); Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 154 (Utah 
1963) . 
In this case, Young Electric Sign Company sought and 
obtained a Rule 54(b) certification that the lower court's 
granting of Marveon's summary judgment against Young Electric 
Sign Company was a final order. The record is absolutely 
devoid of any reference to insurance, yet at oral argument 
before this Court, Mr. Mohrman, YESCO's lawyer, suggested to 
the Court that Marveon, Inc. had insurance and that that was 
somehow relevant to the case. In Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 
154 (Utah 1963), however, the Utah Supreme Court stated "this 
Court cannot consider facts stated in the briefs which may be 
true but absent in the official record." Id. at 155. 
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(Emphasis added.) Surely the same rule is applicable to 
counsel's oral argument on appeal. 
How stringently the Utah Supreme Court has applied the rule 
that appeals must be based on the record developed below was 
demonstrated in Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121 (Utah 1986), 
where the Court refused to overturn a summary judgment that 
clearly would have been defeated by Answers to Interrogatories 
and Answers to Requests for Admissions because the documents 
were not part of the record on appeal. 
The record in this case simply does not support this 
Court's remand to the trial court to "determine an appropriate 
allocation between the two policies, with reference to the 
terms of Marveon's actual policy and the probable terms of the 
policy YESCO should have furnished." 
POINT II 
THE DAMAGE ISSUE RAISED SUA SPONTE BY THE 
COURT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, WAS NOT 
LITIGATED, WAS NOT BRIEFED, AND WAS NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
The Appellate Courts of Utah have held at least 217 times, 
including 18 times in the last year, that issues may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal, but rather must be fully 
raised and litigated below. For example, as recently as 
February 2, 1989, in Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 101 Utah 
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Adv. Rep. 60, to be reported at 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah App., 
Judges Davidson, Bench and Greenwood) Ortiz tried to argue on 
appeal that he was somehow forced to use a letter of a doctor 
rather than the doctor's testimony. The Court flatly rejected 
the argument, stating "We will not consider an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal." IdL at 61. 
In Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237 (Utah App. 
1988) (Judges Greenwood, Orme and Billings) Western Surety 
tried to argue on appeal that summary judgment below was 
inappropriately granted because a genuine issue of fact existed 
regarding whether damages should be offset by the value of the 
vehicle in question without title. The Court flatly rejected 
Western Surety's attempt, stating: 
Issues that are not raised before the trial court may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal . . . The 
issue of whether Curran's damages should be offset by 
the value of the car without title was not raised 
before the trial court. Therefore, this court will 
not consider the issue on appeal, ^d. at 1240. 
In this case, the issue this Court sua sponte chose to 
remand was not raised below, was not litigated below, and was 
not briefed on appeal. In fact, the only issue on appeal was 
stated by Young Electric Sign Company in Young Electric Sign 
Company's March 5, 1987 Docketing Statement, at page 4: 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
The defendant Young Electric Sign Company brings 
the following issue for review in this appeal: 
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1. Whether the language of the Purchase 
Agreement cited by defendant Marveon and its Motion 
for Summary Judgment is sufficient to require the 
defendant YESCO to indemnify and/or insure Marveon for 
its own negligence. 
In fact, "damages'* were an uncontested fact below. The 
very Order and Judgment appealed from, which was based on 
undisputed material facts, pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, states: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of Marveon 
and against YESCO that in the event any judgment is 
returned in favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon 
that Marveon is entitled to be indemnified by YESCO 
for the full amount of any such judgment up to one 
million dollars and that YESCO pay Marveon's costs and 
attorney's fees from an after the date of the tender 
of defense of Marveon to YESCO. (Emphasis added). 
The lower court found that Marveon was entitled to full 
damages from YESCO, up to $1,000,000. No issue was raised 
below with respect to damages, nor was any issue with respect 
to damages preserved on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURT MISCONSTRUES THE ARIZONA CASE IT 
CITES - IN THAT CASE THE PARTY IN BREACH OF 
THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION TO PROVIDE 
INSURANCE WAS REQUIRED TO PAY IN FULL. 
At page 10 of the February 10, 1989 Opinion, this Court 
stated: "In an action for breach of contract to provide 
insurance, the measure of general damages, at least in cases 
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like the instant one, is the amount the policy would have paid 
had it been obtained." This court then cited for this 
proposition the case PPG Industries Inc. v. Continental Heller 
Corp., 124 Ariz. 216, 603 P.2d 108, 113-14 (Ariz. 1979). In 
PPG Industries Inc. v. Continental Heller Corp., however, the 
Arizona court, after discussing two similar, prior Arizona 
cases, reasoned that there was no reason why a party in breach 
of a contractual provision to provide insurance should be 
relieved of its unguestioned liability merely because the 
non-breaching party took the precaution of insuring itself 
against the risk of loss. The Arizona court further reasoned 
that payment to the non-breaching party by its own insurance 
was no defense to the subrogation claim against the breaching 
party "for the obvious reason that it is by the making of such 
payment that the insurer's right of subrogation arises." Id. 
at 113. In the earlier Arizona cases upon which the PPG 
Industries court based its decision, and in the PPG Industries 
case itself, the contractual agreement to provide insurance was 
enforced by the breaching party being required to pay the 
non-breaching party's insurers the amounts actually paid by the 
insurers. There was no remand for the trial court to 
"determine an appropriate allocation between the two 
policies . . . i.e., the non-breaching party's actual policy 
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and the probable terms of the policy the breaching party should 
have furnished." 
POINT IV 
AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, THERE IS NO 
REASON WHY A PARTY IN BREACH OF A 
CONTRACTUAL PROMISE TO PROVIDE INSURANCE 
SHOULD GET THE FORTUITOUS WINDFALL OF THE 
NON-BREACHING PARTY'S PROPHYLACTIC ACTIONS. 
The practical fact of the court's remand is to leave the 
door open for a party in breach of a contractual promise to 
provide insurance to partially, if not totally, get off the 
hook despite the breaching party's own breach. The Court 
provides no justification, and there seems to be none, for such 
a result. The practical consequence of the Court's remand is 
that the non-breaching party will potentially totally pay for 
the precise benefit that the breaching party promised to 
provide. 
The February 10, 1989 Opinion wisely moved promises to 
provide insurance out from under the indemnification agreement, 
"strict construction" rule and into traditional contract 
analysis, yet the remand fails under traditional contract 
analysis. A debtor who breaches a promise to pay is not 
excused because the creditor is paid by the debtor's 
guarantor—the debtor remains fully liable to the guarantor. 
There is no sound reason why a violator of a promise to do an 
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act should escape all liability simply because of a fortuitous 
circumstance unrelated to the violator's acts, yet this is the 
result left open by the Court's remand. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S REMAND WILL PRODUCE INCONSISTENT 
RESULTS FOR PARTIES IN BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL 
PROVISIONS TO PROVIDE INSURANCE, EVEN THOUGH 
SUCH PARTIES HAVE EACH BREACHED SUBSTANTIALLY 
SIMILAR CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS TO PROVIDE 
INSURANCE. 
The Court's remand will produce inconsistent and unjust 
results. Various parties who are in breach of contractual 
promise to provide insurance should be dealt with equally, and 
the consequence to the breaching party should not depend on a 
matter totally unconnected to the breaching party's conduct, 
i.e., whether the non-breaching party provided anywhere from no 
to full insurance coverage. Suppose three separate contracts, 
each containing a provision for one of the parties to the 
contract to provide insurance adequate to fully protect the 
other party. Suppose further that in each of the three 
separate contracts the party who promised to provide the 
insurance provides no insurance at all, and is thus in breach 
of the contractual promise to provide insurance. Suppose 
further that the other party to the first contract provides no 
insurance, the other party to the second contract provides 
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insurance that would contribute 50-50, and the other party to 
the third contract provides purely primary insurance. 
Apparently, the reasoning of this court is that the end result 
for the breaching parties in this scenario would be that the 
breaching party to the first contract would pay 100%, the 
breaching party to the second contract would pay 50%, and the 
breaching party to the third contract would pay nothing at 
all. In this case, even YESCO never argued for any such 
result. YESCO argued vigorously that it was not liable at all, 
but YESCO's entire theory of the case tacitly admitted that if 
it was liable at all, it was 100% liable. Stated simply, the 
law should require people to do what they have promised to do. 
Further, the law should treat each party who has breached a 
contractual promise to provide insurance the same way, and 
petitioner suggests that the appropriate way to treat such 
parties who have breached a contractual promise is to require 
them to fully pay for what they promised to provide. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Marveon Inc. hereby petitions 
this Court to rehear that portion of its February 10, 1989 
Opinion remanding for further proceedings on damages, and 
further respectfully requests this Court to fully affirm the 
Order and Judgment of the lower court. 
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DATED this 22A day of February, 1989. 
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